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YVES GINGRAS
THE SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN HISTORY
OF SCIENCE
In fall 1984, I had the good fortune to meet Sam Schweber when I arrived at
Harvard University’s Department of History of Science as a visiting scholar with a
postdoctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada. Having been trained first in physics, I remembered his name as the
author of the formidably difficult (for me!) Introduction to Relativistic Quantum
Field Theory, which I had closed as soon as I had opened it, as I immediately
realized that the approach was too formal for my taste. Not yet familiar with his
infinite generosity and attention to young scholars, I was really amazed that he asked
me to work with him on an essay review of Andy Pickering’s book, Constructing
Quarks.1 I remember that I told him right away that he would have made a good
priest with his very humanist attitude toward people.
This profoundly humanist aspect of Sam’s personality makes him very concerned
about the future of the discipline of history of science as a community of scholars,
and in this contribution in his honor I would like to briefly address one of the
reasons which, I think, contributes to explain the actual predicament that historians
of science face. I will not raise the obvious question of access to the job market
and the possible overproduction of PhDs in the field. Instead, I want to discuss a
tension inherent in the discipline of history of science, which, I think, lies at the
heart of the recent debates about the state of the discipline.
Probably more than any other kind of historians, historians of science are torn
between several masters: scientists, philosophers, sociologists and general histo-
rians. Fifteen years ago, Paul Forman made a major contribution to the question
of the intimate relation between historians of science and scientists, condemning
the lack of intellectual autonomy of the former from the latter.2 But his call for
“independence not transcendence for the historian of science” is still to be fulfilled
when one sees the various pressures scientists put on historians of science who want
to do more than simply contribute to the creation and celebration of the internal
mythology of scientific disciplines. While Forman had a moral view of the need
for independence, insisting that each individual had to stand up and fight for his
or her autonomous judgment, I think that an institutional analysis provides a better
way to identify mechanisms in which this autonomy could be grounded.
1 Yves Gingras and Silvan S. Schweber, “Constraints on Construction”, Social Studies of Science,
vol. 16, May 1986, pp. 372–383.
2 Paul Forman, “Independence not Transcendence for the Historian of Science”, Isis, vol. 82, March
1991, pp. 71–86.
J. Renn and K. Gavroglu (eds.), Positioning the History of Science, 61–64.
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62 Yves Gingras
As Forman rightly observed, professional independence is not the same as intel-
lectual independence.3 But I think the specific form taken by this professional
autonomy, particularly in the United States, is not unrelated to the identity crisis
felt by many historians of science. The creation of special Departments of History
of Science (or any combination of history and philosophy and sociology of science
and technology) outside established departments of history has not, I think, helped
historians of science to take their distance from scientists. In fact, the gaining of
independence was made even more difficult when these special departments were
located in faculties of science instead of faculties of humanities and social sciences.
This particular form of institutionalization of history of science was largely
contingent and had no logical necessity. After all, over the last century the discipline
of history has always been able to adapt to a changing context by incorporating
new objects of historical inquiry into its curriculum and research agenda. The
emergence of the special fields of history of workers, industrialization, immigration,
women, etc., inside history departments – often through difficult academic debates –
clearly shows that a specialization of history of science, as opposed to creating
an autonomous discipline, was possible. Being an integral part of the historical
discipline would help historians of science to benefit from the sense of intel-
lectual autonomy that historians have acquired over the years. A diverse and strong
historical discipline certainly helps curb any control that some actors would like
to have over the kind of questions raised – and answers proposed – about objects
chosen. Sam often said publicly that for him, Frank Manuel was a model historian.
It is not insignificant, I think, that as a historian Manuel was not feeling the
pressure of the scientist’s “super ego” peering over his shoulder when he wrote
Isaac Newton Historian and A Portrait of Isaac Newton. In short: institutional
distance can contribute to intellectual independence.
Comparing the historian of science with the political historian sheds new light
on the limited autonomy of the former compared to the latter. Which professional
historian would take seriously a book on political history controlled by a panel of
former politicians? By contrast, few eyebrows were raised at the publication of the
book on the history of solid state physics, Out of the Crystal Maze although the
whole enterprise was in fact controlled by a “blue-ribbon” committee of physicists
(some of them Nobel Prize winners) who were also central actors in the story
and decided which topics to include and to exclude. Surprisingly, even this benign
comparison may be considered offensive and may be rejected by scientists or their
self-appointed spokespersons. In fact, I personally experienced this reaction when I
asked the above question using this comparison with political control in a review of
that book for the journal Science. Simply suggesting such lack of independence (if
not a direct conflict of interests) was too much and – as I had in fact expected4 – they
3 Ibid., p. 77.
4 Dominique Pestre was witness to that prediction. I wrote the review while in Paris, showed it to
him and said they would call me on receiving it to cut the analogy with politics. Which they did …
Who said sociology cannot be experimental?
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asked me to get rid of that analogy and to rephrase my analysis. They finally
accepted that I conclude by saying that “let us hope that historians of science will
use [the book] to frame their questions in the terms of their own discipline rather
than according to the preoccupations of the scientists, which are perfectly legitimate
but nonetheless distinct from those of historians”.5 That the journal Science was
a gatekeeper not only of the content of science but also of its public image was
obvious to me but this fact became even more obvious when four years later the
book review editor of the journal took “early retirement” over the turmoil raised by
the publication of Paul Forman’s review of the book The Flight from Science and
Reason.6
The “science war” is thus simply the most recent attempt by scientists to regain
control of the research agenda of historians of science.7 The decision not to appoint
Norton Wise at the Institute for Advanced Study in 1997 should be more than suffi-
cient to show that institutional autonomy from scientists is crucial for intellectual
autonomy. Confronted with such events, it is amazing to see how much energy
is consumed by some historians and sociologists of science in order to convince
scientists that they should care about their work, when it is in fact obvious that the
aims of historians’ and sociologists’ analysis cannot be the same or even congruent
with those of scientists without losing their specificity.8 Here again the analogy with
political history is interesting: when politicians disagree with a historical analysis
provided by a professional historian, nobody expects the historians to bend over
backwards in order to convince the politicians.
Instead of trying to win scientists for their analyses, historians of science should
strive for a better integration of history of science into mainstream intellectual,
social and cultural history. For if it is true that science is part of history and not
outside it, then the teaching of (and research in) history of science should also be
part of history departments and not outside them. Of course, this does not mean
that history of science departments as such cannot gain independence of thought.
It only means that they are more vulnerable than generic disciplines like history,
sociology and philosophy in periods of crisis. It is also clear that a better integration
within the historical discipline will transform the analytical approaches, as the rise
of social history of science and the relative decline of technical or internal history
are in large part effects of a more thorough historicizing of science.
The main losers will of course be the scientists who will have greater difficulties
in trying to control the historians’ research agendas and who will lose their “scribes”
5 Yves Gingras, “Redefinitions in Physics”, Science, vol. 260, 21 May 1993, pp. 1165–1166.
6 For a brief summary of these events see The Economist, 13 December 1997, pp. 77–79.
7 If one includes larger social debates one should also remember the cancellation in 1995 of the
original Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian; see Edward T. Linenthal, Tom Engelhardt (Eds),
History Wars. The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past, New York, Metropolitan
Book, 1996.
8 I am thinking here of the book edited by Jay A. Labinger and Harry Collins, The One Culture?
A Conversation About Science, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001.
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who wrote their grandiose odyssey as previous historians wrote the life of famous
politicians, insisting on their devotion to their nation and their grandeur d’âme.
Now scientists will have to write these kinds of books for themselves; for this genre
is no longer part of an autonomous specialty that defines for itself the hierarchy of
legitimate questions and answers about “science” as an historical entity.
Département d’histoire
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